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NEW JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO
MAINTAINING HOUSING QUALITY IN THE
CITIES
I. Introduction
Virtually every member of the urban community is a party to a
landlord-tenant relationship. As the general tenor of urban life in
America changes, so must the laws which govern the urban dweller.
For years the doctrine of caveat emptor prevented the tenant from
forcing the landlord to make necessary repairs or to retain the leased
premises in a habitable condition. The doctrine of constructive evic-
tion afforded him little relief;' and housing and sanitation codes,
while achieving a measure of success, were generally ineffective.2
1. See R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 230(3) (1971); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habit-
ability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant? 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123 (1971).
2. Housing codes are normally municipal ordinances "designed for comprehensive and
effective regulation of occupancy and facilities in existing housing." Note, Municipal Housing
Codes, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (1956). Their objectives include the installation of certain
facilities such as electricity, heating, waste disposal, and ventilation, the establishment of
standards for the continued maintenance of the structural facilities, and the regulation of the
density of occupancy. Id. at 1115-16.
While today's housing laws vary greatly from state to state, there are three generally
recognized categories of statutes. One requires the landlord to maintain the premises in good
condition and expressly provides for recovery in tort by those persons injured-on the leased
premises. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 61-112 (1966); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 670, 2322, 2692-
93, 2695 (West 1952). A few states have the "repair and deduct" type statutes, which provide
that, if the landlord fails to make necessary repairs, the tenant may either abandon the
premises or may with certain limitations, make the repairs himself and deduct the expense
from the rent payment. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954), as amended, (West
Supp. 1975). The most common is the penal type statute. This type of code, which applies
mainly to multiple dwellings and tenement houses, requires the owner of the premises to keep
them in repair. Violations are punishable by fine or imprisonment. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 144, §§ 66, 89 (1972); N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELL. LAW § 304 (McKinney 1974).
These codes fix minimum standards for all dwellings within the code's jurisdiction. Gener-
ally, minimum housing code standards are designed to maintain a marginal level of health
and safety in dilapidated housing units often located in the slum areas of the municipality.
A code designed to serve the needs of this housing population would appear both inadequate
in scope and impractical in application to satisfy the needs of a housing population in a
conservational area, where deterioration has not progressed too far and the upgrading of
existing units is the desired goal. See generally Note, supra at 1118, 1122.
Another problem encountered in enforcement is the financial inability of the landlord to
effect repair. In the worst areas, the amount of repair required to bring the dwellings within
the standards set by the code is bound to involve relatively large expenditures. Although the
average landlord may be unable financially to comply with the repair order or may view such
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Only when conditions became unbearable did the law protect him.'
Increasingly, however, the trend has been to enlarge the responsi-
bilities of the landowner,4 through such devices as rent strikes, ' rent
abatement,' and the warranty of habitability.7 This has been due,
in large measure, to the recognition of the need for quality housing,
the unequal bargaining positions of the landlord and tenant, and the
changed status of the tenant from rural to urban.' The cases which
serve as the focus of this Note, wherein contract and tort theories
are u~ed in novel ways to impose greater duties on landowners, are
the most recent developments in this progression.
II. Extending the Warranty of Habitability
In Key 48th Street Realty Co. v. Munez,9 plaintiff-tenants sued
for restoration and rehabilitation of their fire-gutted apartments.
The destruction was complete and forced plaintiffs to vacate.' Dur-
ing rehabilitation the tenants were free of their obligation to pay
rent." The court held that the landlord had a duty to restore and
repair the premises at his own expense. 2 In addition, upon renova-
tion, the apartments were to retain their rent-controlled status.
an order as economically infeasible, repairs, nevertheless, must be made if code sanctions for
noncompliance are to be avoided.
The standards established by housing codes are often minimal, inflexible, and unable to
keep up with changing nee is. The codes generally impose no standards delineating how the
landlord is to carry out his duties, and enforcement has been ineffective. See generally Note,
-Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 739, 756 (1971). While housing codes are a step in the right direction, they do not
protect the tenant completely.
3. For a general discussion of the inadequacies of the traditional approach to landlord-
tenant law, see Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969).
4. For a comprehensive bibliography of this trend, see Developments in Contemporary
Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REV. 689, 731-44 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.570-.580 (Vernon Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:42-85 to -97 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIONs LAW §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp.
- 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1975).
6.' See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-24a (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
239, § 8A (Supp. 1974); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney 1974).
7. See text accompanying notes 23-27 infra.
8. See Cooper, Kwartler & Reiss, Pointing the Way to Housing Quality, 2 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 1 (1973).
9. 174 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Civ. Ct. Sept. 22, 1975).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
NOTES
The court based its decision on an extension of the policy surround-
ing the implied warranty of habitability doctrine.
Until recently, a lease had been considered primarily a convey-
ance of an interest in land,'4 with major emphasis on the tenant's
right to possession. Under the traditional theory, the lessor's letting
without specific stipulation implied only that he held title and guar-
anteed the lessee quiet enjoyment and occupation. The lessor did
not warrant that the conveyed property was in any particular condi-
tion or state of repair. 5 Moreover, the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment did not impose upon the landlord a concomitant obliga-
tion to repair or to maintain the premises, absent an express provi-
sion in the lease. 6 Caveat emptor was the law regarding repairs;
when the tenant signed the lease, he simply accepted the leasehold
and assumed all the possible risks of damage." The conveyance
theory was justified by the rural agrarian character of society; a
lessee's primary interest was the land he would farm to secure a
livelihood." For the quiet enjoyment of the estate the tenant was
obliged to pay rent. If he failed to do so, he was in danger of losing
possession, the real value of the bargain. 9
Modern-day courts have recognized that the conditions forming
the basis of the English common law rule have changed. ' " The shift
from-independent farmers to transient apartment dwellers removed
the basis for the rule that a lease is a real property conveyance; the
traditional construction of a lease unfairly placed severe burdens on
the urban lessee, forcing him to pay rent so long as he remained in
14. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
15. See, e.g., Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Bailey v.
Kelly, 93 Kan. 723, 145 P. 556 (1915); Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y. 306, 30 N.E. 837 (1892). See
generally 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 99 (3d ed. 1939).
16. 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 103 (3d ed. 1939).
17. R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 233 (1966). However, the landlord could
expressly covenant to make certain repairs. For example, in Broadway Flame Co. v. Saun-
ders, 163 N.Y.L.J. 2 (Civ. Ct. Jan. 26, 1970), the court was faced with a situation similar to
Key 48th Street. Tenants were forced to abandon their fire-gutted apartments. In this case
there was a specific clause in the lease providing that in the event of fire the leased premises
were to be repaired by the landlord. Id. The court ordered the landlord to comply with the
lease provision and institute the repairs at his own expense. Id. at 13.
18. See generally Comment, Landlord and Tenant: Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11
SANTA CLARA LAW. 298 (1971).
19. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 226.
20. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14
Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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possession, regardless of defects in the leased premises. Despite this
recognition, these same courts have been reluctant to explore the
contractual nature of a lease as a solution to landlord-tenant prob-
lems. Thus, the breach of an express covenant to repair or supply
services was held not to excuse the tenant from his obligation to pay
rent, even though the failure of the covenant destroyed or impaired
the real value of the lease." Even if the tenant chose to abandon the
premises he was liable for the rent covering the entire term of the
lease tinder a periodic tenancy or tenancy for years.22
Only two exceptions to the basic rule of caveat emptor have devel-
oped. There was an implied warranty of habitability in short-term
leases, since tenants in such situations are often unable to inspect
a dwelling adequately and wish "to enjoy . . . without delay, and
without the expense of preparing it for use."' ' 3 Pines v. Perssion"
extended the short-term lease exception to cover leases up to one
year in duration. Two other decisons indicated a desire to abolish
the rule entirely in favor of a contractual theory of leases embodying
a judicially implied warranty of habitability. In Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper 5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that the present
day demands of fair treatment are adequate to impose upon a land-
lord an implied warranty against latent, remediable defects.26 In
Lemle v. Breeden," the lessee of a furnished house sought to recover
a deposit and rent payment from the lessor on the ground that the
house which he had rented for two separate but quite short periods
was so rat-infested that it was uninhabitable. This "material breach
of the implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use in-
tended . . . justified [the lessee's] rescinding the rental agreement
and vacating the premises.""
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp., plaintiff-landlord
21. Quinn v. Phillips, supra note 3, at 233.
22. Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 455, 15 N.E.2d 476, 479 (1938); Ravkind v. Jones
Apothecary, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
23. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); see, e.g., Young v. Povich,
121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942).
24. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
25. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
26. Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273 (dictum).
27. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
28. Id. at 436, 462 P.2d at 476.
29. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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brought an action for possession of leased premises alleging nonpay-
ment of rent due under a written lease.3 0 The tenants admitted non-
payment but in defense offered to prove that the landlord was
guilty of over 1,500 violations of the District of Columbia Housing
Code.31 The court held that a warranty of habitability measured by
the standards of the housing regulations is implied in all leases
covered by those regulations, because leases or urban dwelling units
should be interpreted and construed like any other contract. The
court recognized that the common law interpretation of a lease as a
conveyance of property interest was based on certain factual as-
sumptions which are no longer true.32
In Tonetti v. Penati,33 New York formally rejected the common
law approach and adopted the implied warranty of habitability
theory.34 Defendant entered into an agreement to rent a private
house, in which a terrible stench had been created by the previous
tenant's dogs. Defendant was assured by plaintiff-landlord that the
odor would be removed. However, upon occupation, the defendant
and his family found that the odor persisted and were later unsuc-
cessful in their own attempts at fumigation. In addition, it was
discovered that the furnace emitted an intolerable odor and that
rats were present in the basement. The court found that the prem-
ises were not habitable for residential purposes, and held, on a war-
ranty of habitability theory, that defendant was not liable for the
rent. 5
The court likened the urban dweller to a consumer36 and stated
30. Id. at 1073.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1079-81.
33. 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975).
34. The lower New York court opinions which supported the implied warranty of habita-
bility are: Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct. 1973);
Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971);
Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971). Several jurisdic-
tions have adopted an implied warranty of habitability. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62,
102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d
351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Rome v. Walker, 38
Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339
(1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d'160 (1973).
35. 48 App. Div. 2d at 30, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
36. Id. at 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 807. In other areas of the law the concept of implied
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that landlord-tenant law must be brought into harmony with the
principles underlying consumer protection cases. In analyzing the
law, the court found that the common law rule of caveat emptor
"has no rational basis in a modern, urban society."37 The same
factors" which were considered controlling in developing warranties
of fitness and merchantability in sales of goods and services, as well
in other areas,3" should be applicable to the urban lease. No longer
was the rule caveat lessee valid."
What constitutes a breach of implied warranty varies among ju-
risdictions. Some require a material breach rendering the dwelling
so unsafe or unsanitary as to be unfit for human occupation." Oth-
ers grant recovery for lesser defects. 2
warranties has been readily accepted. Contract and tort have recognized that a warranty of
fitness for use is implied when a consumer purchases goods. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ToRTs § 95 (4th ed. 1971). Most states have codified implied warranties through the
adoption of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315.
37. 48 App. Div. 2d at 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The main concern of today's tenant is
that he acquires premises which he can enjoy for living purposes; he is more mobile and
generally less skilled at maintenance than the agrarian tenant; repairs are more costly and
dwellings with modern plumbing and electrical facilities are more complex. Id.
38. The characterization of a lease as a "package of goods and services" has prompted
several courts to apply products liability principles to the landlord-tenant relation by anal-
ogy. Like the consumer, the modem urban tenant relies on the landlord's implied representa-
tion that the premises are fit for human habitation. Like the commercial businessman, the
landlord has the "greater opportunity, incentive and capacity than a tenant to inspect and
maintain the condition of his apartment building." Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616,
627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974). Moreover, if the landlord is in the
business of leasing, he is in a better position to distribute the cost of maintaining the prem-
ises. Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24, 37 (1970). These
similarities between the merchant-consumer transaction and the landlord-tenant relation
have prompted the courts to conclude that there should be an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in the lease of real property, just as there is an implied warranty of merchantibility in
the sale or lease of personal property, and just as there is an implied warranty of habitability
in the sale of real property.
39. See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Trucks Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965). See generally Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957).
40. 48 App. Div. 2d at 30, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 808. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has found that one who seeks to purchase adequate shelter for a specified period
of time is forced to rely on the skill and honesty of the landlord, who has "much greater
opportunity, incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain the condition of his building."
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
41. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
42. See, e.g., Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 835-36 (D.C. App. 1968).
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The triers of fact who must determine whether the implied war-
ranty of habitability has been breached, so as to justify the suspen-
sion of rent payments, will find little assistance in the uncertain
guidelines issued by Tonetti. The unbearable odors and unsanitary
conditions in that case made living impossible. 3 Strictly construed,
Tonetti indicates that New York may require extremely bad condi-
tions to justify rent withholding."
In Cohen v. Werner,4" decided shortly after Tonetti, the
defendant-tenant claimed that noise emanating from another
apartment in the building forced him to move out." The court held
that the landlord could have made the premises habitable by at-
tempting to restrain the noise." Since he did not, the defendant was
justified in quitting the premises, thereby terminating his obligation
to pay the rent."
The Cohen court recognized" that there is implied in every
residential tenancy a warranty by the landlord to maintain the apartment
in a condition suitable for decent living. Where there has been a substantial
failure by the landlord to maintain the apartment in habitable condition, the
right to receive rent is made subject to a defense comparable to that available
in virtually every part of our society to one who does not receive that for
which he agreed to pay.
Neither Cohen not Tonetti attempt to define the factors which
constitute "habitability," or to detail how substantial the landlord's
failure must be in order to justify rent withholding.
43. 48 App. Div. 2d at 26-27, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06.
44. In an earlier decision, Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 21, 318 N.Y.S.2d
11, 19 (Civ. Ct. 1971), the court based its decision on the proven attempts of the owner to
force the removal of the tenants under an established plan of non-compliance, and upon his
refusal to effect greater building security after each of the tenants was victimized by intruding
drug addicts. Three conditions were set forth as constituting grounds for withholding rent:
(1) Where the landlord has not made a good faith effort to comply with the law, and
there have been substantial violations seriously affecting the habitability of the prem-
ises.
(2) Where there are substantial violations and code enforcement remedies have been
pursued and have been ineffective. -
(3) Where substantial violations exist and their continuance is part of a purposeful
and illegal effort to force the tenants to abandon their apartments.
Id.
45. 84 Misc. 2d 295, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
46. Id. at 295-96, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
47. Id. at 298, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 297, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1007, quoting Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d
996, 999, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (emphasis added).
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Several jurisdictions have based the implied warranty of habita-
bility on the enactment of housing codes; others have relied on
judicial constructs. In the former, the standard of habitability is set
by statute. 0 Not every housing code violation is a breach of the
implied warranty; only "substantial" violations are actionable."
However, what is, and what is not, a "substantial" violation is far
from certain.
When the implied warranty is judicially determined it is even less
susceptible to definition." A typical warranty is that the premises
are "habitable and fit for living."5 Once again, only "substantial"
or "material" breaches are actionable. 4 The following factors have
been identified as relevant to a determination of the issue of materi-
ality: (1) the nature and seriousness of the deficiency or defect; (2)
the effect of the defect on habitability, safety, or sanitation of the
premises; (3) the length of time the defect has existed; (4) the age
of the structure; and (5) the amount of the rent. By requiring
materiality, courts do not require the landlord to ensure that the
premises are in perfect or aesthetically pleasing condition, but
rather that "bare living requirements" are maintained.
Several courts, which have adopted a judicially determined war-
ranty of habitability based on 'public policy considerations, have
used the housing code as a minimum standard of habitability or as
a factor in determining whether the warranty has been breached.
The New York Court of Appeals, however, has not yet equated the
standards established by the implied warranty of habitability with
those mandated by municipal housing codes. New York has, how-
50. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972).
For a discussion of housing codes, see note 2 supra.
51. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.63 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 .S. 925 (1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 366, 280 N:E.2d 208,,
217 (1972).
52. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 476, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii
473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).
54. See id.
55. Id.; accord Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W. 2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v. Gambino,
63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
56. Eg., Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637-38, 517 P.2d 1168, 113, 111 Cal.
704, 719 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J.
460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 999, 343
N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
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ever, recently passed an implied warranty of habitability statute"
which protects tenants from any "conditions which would be dan-
gerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety."58
Key 48th Street Realty dealt with a situation in which fire had
damaged the landlord's building. The tenants, who were routed by
fire, attempted to force the landlord to repair the building. The
court ordered the landlord to restore the fire-gutted apartments.
The theory adopted by the court requires the landlord to maintain
an entire building in habitable condition in addition to his implied
contractual duty to provide essential services and keep individual
dwelling units in a fit condition if the remaining portion of the
-landlord's destroyed building remains viable.59 A building is viable,
in the court's opinion, if the percentage of destroyed apartments is
less than 25 percent of the total number of apartments in the build-
ing, no major structural renovations are required, fire insurance
proceeds are forthcoming, and the total amount of repairs is not
disproportionate to the assessed valuation of the building. 0
Key 48th Street Realty set out the above rules in a situation where
the landlord's building was rent controlled. Rent control' was in-
tended to prevent "unfair" rent increases. However, the result of
rent control has often been undermaintenance and reduction of
services.2 Owners of controlled properties often do not receive suffi-
cient income to justify even normal maintenance.63 As conditions
deteriorate and monies remain the same, the buildings become ripe
for abandonment. It would seem that in situations similar to Key
48th Street Realty Co., where the landlord has additional obliga-
57. Act of Aug. 1, 1975, ch. 597, § 1, N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 597 (McKinney 1975).
58. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1975).
59. 174 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Civ. Ct. Sept. 22, 1975).
60. Id.
61. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 51, tit. Y (1975). Rent control legislation was
passed in 1947 to deal with post-war housing shortages. In 1971, a decontrol law was enacted
removing any apartment vacated after June 30, 1971 from rent control. Act of June 1, 1971,
ch. 371, § 6 [1971] N.Y. Laws 1161. However, in 1974, the law was again amended so as to
subject those apartments which were vacancy decontrolled to the rent stabilization law. Act
of May 29, 1974, ch. 576, § 2, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1510 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §
8605 (McKinney Supp. 1975)). For the provision of New York City's rent stabilization law,
see NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 51, tit. YY (1975).
62. Mann, Receivership of Problem Buildings in New York City and its Potential for
Decent Housing of the Poor, 9 COLUM. J. OF LAW AND SOC. PROBS. 309, 320 (1973).
63. NEW YORK CITY RAND INSTITUTE, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 6-7 (1970).
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tions to perform without rental increases, maintenance will be fore-
gone and abandonment will result. Nonprofitability is no defense
to a landlord's failure to repair." However, by ignoring the issue of
profitability in this type of case, courts may force the landlord to
give up his investment. Thus the Key 48th Street Realty Co. deci-
sion seems to ignore the financial predicament of the landlords. If
the plaintiff's rent-controlled apartment allowed only a minimal
profit margin, even court imposed renovation costs that do not ap-
pearexcessive on their face 15 may cause hardship to the point of
abandonment. Landowners who can no longer operate their rental
property because of the impossibility of recouping the cost of repair
will elect an obvious alternative -closing the building. The effect
will be to evict the tenants into a housing market with an inade-
quate supply of low-income units.6
From the tenant's point of view, several aspects of the landlord-
tenant relationship may justify Key 48th Street Realty Co. The
inequality of bargaining power, the adverse social impact of sub-
standard housing, and the critical housing shortage suggest that the
tenant's expectations that the landlord will rehabilitate an uninten-
tionally destroyed apartment should be protected. Millions of
American families have no effective choice but to live in dwellings
that suffer from any or all of the defects by which' bad housing is
measured: insufficient size; inadequate facilities; unsuitable loca-
tion; danger to safety or health; and cost that exceeds the means of
the family. By charging the landlord with maintaining a total build-
ing, the court has placed the burden of maintaining the available
housing fit for human habitation where public policy seems to dic-
tate.
64. 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 374 (1972). For cases dealing with the power of the state to require
changes in existing buildings in accordance with new building codes, see Annot., 109 A.L.R.
1117 (1937).
65. The court in Key 48th Street Realty Co. took note of the fact that defendant had fire
insurance to cover his losses. 174 N.Y.L.J. at 17. But even the recovered amount may not be
enough to pay all renovation costs.
66. The current housing crisis in this country is characterized by an insufficient number
of quality housing units. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, REPORT: A DECENT HOME
7-8 (1968). The President's Committee noted a study by TEMPO, General Electric's Center
for Advanced' Studies, which found that even though in 1968, 66 million housing units existed
for 60 million households an estimated 6.7 million of the units occupied were in substandard
condition (four million lacked indoor plumbing and 2.7 million were in a dilapidated condi-
tion.) Id.
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NOTES
III. Applying Nuisance Law to the Abandoned Housing
Problem
Justas an extension of the contract theory of implied habitability
has subjected landlords to greater responsibilities vis-a-vis their
tenants, so too a new tort application of nuisance law has recently
been applied to increase the potential liability of landlords to neigh-
boring property owners if such landlords fail to maintain their prem-
ises.
Ownership of real property has never conferred an absolute right
to do whatever one pleases with the land. 7 One common law doc-
trine which recognizes limitations on the rights of property owners
is the law of nuisance."8 As a mode of land-use control, nuisance
prevents one landowner from making an unreasonable use of his own
premises to the material injury of his neighbor's property. 9 If he
does, the injured party has a right of action even though he is not
driven from his dwelling.7" Of all common law tort theories, nuisance
affords the abutting landowner the broadest possible recovery, since
the cause of action may arise through intent, negligence, or absolute
liability for ultra-hazardous invasion of property.7' Remedies for
nuisance include abatement, injunction, contempt damages, decla-
ratory judgments, and, in the case of a public nuisance, criminal
sanctions.72
In Puritan Holding Co., Inc. v. Holloschitz73 plaintiff owned a.
renovated apartment building located directly across the street from
defendant's abandoned building. Due to the unsightly condition of
the defendant's building, plaintiff was unable to obtain a mortgage.
In addition, a real estate expert testified that plaintiff's building
67. Gross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1955); Philbrick,
Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938).
68. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 86 (4th ed. 1971).
69. The general rule as stated in Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267,
274, 35 N.E. 592, 594 (1893) is that "no one has absolute freedom in the use of his property,
but is restrained by the co-existence of equal rights in his neighbor to the use of his property
70. McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). The interference must be substantial, unreasona-
ble, and offensive to a person of normal sensibilities. RESTATEMEN4T OF TORTS, Explanatory
notes § 822, Comment g at 229 (1939). A defendant to a private nuisance may prevail by
proving that he is making a reasonable use of his property.
72. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 941, Comment c at 711-12 (1939).
73. 82 Misc. 2d 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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had suffered a significant depreciation in value. Proof at trial indi-
cated that defendant's building had deteriorated and been taken
over by derelicts." The court noted that the two buildings were
located in a residential community which was attempting to redev-
elop, and found that the failure of the defendant to supervise her
abandoned property constituted the maintenance of a private nuis-
ance.
75
The central issue in any private nuisance action is not merely
whether there has been an interference with the natural right to
reasonable enjoyment of one's property, but whether this interfer-
ence is an unreasonable one."6 Reasonableness in a particular case
depends upon several factors: gravity of harm to the plaintiff; utility
of the defendant's conduct; the character of the neighborhood; and
the use to which plaintiff puts his land. 77 These criteria are neither
rigid nor exclusive; rather, the judge has discretion to include and
emphasize these factors and others as the details of the situation
and the social implications of responsible land use require.
In nuisance actions, courts attempt to strike a balance between
the rights of the parties in considering the social value of their
conduct.,8 In Puritan Holding Co. there were no competing interests
to balance. Plaintiff sought to utilize her property constructively as
part of a neighborhood redevelopment effort.7" Defendant's aban-
doned building, however, could only be considered a detriment to
plaintiff and the surrounding vicinity, with no redeeming value.
Therefore, the court's conclusion that defendant's property consti-
tuted a private nuisance seems correct.
In Puritan Holding Co. the interference with plaintiff's use and
enjoyment of her land was the depreciation of its property value."0
However, the general rule is that depreciation of property value is
74. Id. at 905, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
75. Id. at 906, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
76. Waters v. McNearney, 8 App. Div. 2d 13,.185 N.Y.S.2d 29 (3rd Dep't. 1959).
77. See, e.g., Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919);
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907); Messina v. Scarlata,
26 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 875, 26 N.Y.S.2d 597 (4th Dep't 1941);
Johnson v. Drysdale, 66 S.D. 436, 285 N.W. 301 (1939).
78. See, e.g., Beam v. Birmingham Slag Co., 243 Ala. 313, 10 So. 2d 162 (1942); Sans v.
Ramsey Golf & Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438, 149 A.2d 599 (1959); Roberts v. C.F. Adams
& Son, 199 Okla. 369, 184 P.2d 634 (1947).
79. 82 Misc. 2d at 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
80. Id. at 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
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not in itself sufficient to support a cause of action for nuisance."
In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board of Town of Brighton,"
community members complained when their property suffered a
depreciation in value. They alleged that the depreciation was
caused by noise and inconvenience occasioned by the establishment
of a church and school with appurtenant play areas and parking
fields. 3 The New York Court of Appeals held that this was insuffi-
cient to sustain a nuisance cause of action.84 The benefit to be
gained from a church in the community outweighed the interests of
individual landowners. "Moreover, in view of the high purposes, and
moral value, of these institutions, mere pecuniary loss to a few
persons should not bar their erection and use."85 The social value of
the defendant's land use was a controlling factor in the court's deci-
sion to deny relief to the plaintiffs. The problem is striking a bal-
ance as nearly as possible between the respective rights of the par-
ties. Unlike Diocese of Rochester, there was no high purpose and
moral value to defendant's actions in Puritan Holding Co.; thus, in
such a case plaintiff may recover the lost value of her property.
The general rule in these cases is that no action will lie for aes-
thetic discomfort and inconvenience alone." The basic reasons for
the reluctance of the courts to recognize offensive visual stimuli as
bases for nuisance actions are the association of such perceptions
with aesthetics. Courts guard against the fear that the recognition
of visual stimuli as an element of a cause of action will lead to petty
actions based on different tastes rather than substantial injuries.8"
81. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d
383 (1966); White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 241 P. 367 (1925); Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wash.
2d 275, 300 P.2d 569 (1956); Crawford v. Central Steam Laundry, 78 Wash. 355, 139 P. 56
(1914).
82. 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
83. Id. at 516, 136 N.E.2d at 830, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
84. Id. at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
85. Id. at 524, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
86. Something is not a nuisance solely because it is unsightly or offensive to the aesthetic
sense: Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 11. 11, 185 N.E. 170 (1933); Martin v. Williams,
141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956); as to unsightliness of buildings: Bristol Door & Lumber
Co. v. Bristol, 97 Va. 304, 33 S.E. 588 (1899).
87. See Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1939).
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The test in determining aesthetic nuisances is one of reasonable-
ness. In Puritan Holding Co. it is not impracticable to ascertain a
reasonable man's reaction to defendant's abandoned building even
though no interference with physical comfort is involved. The un-
sightliness of defendant's structure did not involve questions of
taste and preference. The difficulties of determining the effect on
the ordinary man are little greater than in those branches of the law
of nuisance, which deal with contamination of the atmosphere by
odors or with disturbance by noise. "An eyesore in the neighborhood
of residences might be as much a [public] muisance [sic] and as
ruinous to property values in the neighborhood generally, as a dis-
agreeable noise, or odor, or a menace to safety or health."88
Remedies for nuisance are varied and flexible. Formerly, a plain-
tiff seeking damages from a defendant for the maintenance of a
nuisance was limited to damages for harm suffered up to the
commencement of the action."9 This required a plaintiff to institute
multiple suits, as the actions arose, in order to gain full compensa-
tion for his continuing injury.'" Eventually, however, it was recog-
nized that "[wihere a nuisance is of such a permanent and unabat-
able character that a single recovery can be had, including the whole
damage past and future resulting therefrom, there can be but one
recovery .... ,,0' Permanent damages are based on the theory of
servitude on land,92 and assume that a monetary award is sufficient
compensation for causing the plaintiff's property to remain subject
to the adjudicated nuisance.
One disadvantage of the award of permanent damages in Puritan
Holding Co. is the possibility of a multiplicity of suits.9" The opinion
states that "[t]he building's condition has caused a deterioration
88. State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923).
89. Generally, in an action for damages for a temporary or abatable nuisance, the recovery
is limited to the damage occasioned up to the time of the commencement of the action.
Denver City Irrig. & Water Co. v. Middaugh, 12 Colo. 434, 21 P. 565 (1889).
90. Western N.Y. Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 91 Misc. 73, 80, 154 N.Y.S. 1046,
1050 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 176 App. Div. 944 (4th Dep't 1917), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E.
894 (1919).
91. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 140 (1950).
92. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62, 267 (1946).
93. 372 N.Y.S.2d at 502. See also Shearing v. City of Rochester, 51 Misc. 2d 436, 439, 237
N.Y.S.2d 464, 467-68 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ("An injunction prevents a multiplicity of suits, a policy
which the law favors since the peace and good order of society are best promoted by the
termination of such litigations by a single suit.")
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in values on the block."94 Granting a monetary award to one apart-
ment owner in the community may be an incentive for others to
institute similar suits. Moreover, the invasion of plaintiff's rights is
not necessarily permanent. The offending situation may be reme-
died, and plaintiff's land may be restored to its former condition.
A more frequent remedy employed in nuisance cases is the injunc-
tion.5 The primary reason for injunctions in nuisance cases is that
the interest protected, personal investment in the enjoyment of
one's property, is incapable of measurement in monetary terms.9
Ordinarily an injunction is framed in specific terms; the defen-
dant is ordered not to do certain acts, or, when the court issues a
mandatory decree, to carry out designated acts. However, the court
is not bound to issue such a decree, but rather it can leave the means
of performance to the defendant's discretion, reserving the power to
modify the decree." It would seem that from the plaintiff's point of
view a grant of permanent damages is far less satisfactory than an
injunction. With a monetary grant the abandoned building remains
and plaintiff still would be unable to obtain her desired mortgage.
Since many potential conflicts in modern urban environments
may involve less tangible interferences with land, such as odors,
smoke, and dilapidated buildings, nuisance law provides the most
important source of common law rules for shifting the risk of loss
for these harms. The failure to grant injunctions in such cases as
Puritan Holding Co. could lead to long term economic loss; a result
may be the flight of more prosperous tax-paying residents to other
areas, thereby compounding the existing situation.
Declaring buildings to be nuisances and granting permanent
damages does not increase the available housing supply. Those who
sue may be compensated, but other property owners will not be
94. 82 Misc. 2d at 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (emphasis added).
95. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.7 (1973).
96.. See, e.g., Adams v. Snouffer, 88 Ohio App. 79, 82, 87 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1949).
97. In modern cases, the balancing of hardships and equities has led to the development
of the partial and experimental injunction. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.7 (1973). The power
of the court to issue a flexible decree can insure the proper adjustment of conflicting interests.
Practical considerations may militate against giving full kr immediate protection to the
plaintiff's interest. Experimental relief benefits both the plaintiff and the defendant. It ena-
bles the defendant to satisfy the duty the court finds owing, but at the same time to minimize
the adverse effect to his interests. 1 -nables the plaintiff to obtain some masures of relief,
when otherwise any relief might have Deen denied due to hardship, impracticality or the like.
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benefited as they would have been had the defendant owner been
induced to put the judgment money into upgrading his dilapidated
housing.
IV. Conclusion
Courts are increasingly regulating the landlord and tenant rela-
tionship by the use of contract principles. But even standard con-
tract remedies have often proved inadequate. The use of tort princi-
ples to expand the legal protection available to neighboring property
owners is an important additional step. A tenant subjected to unin-
habitable living conditions, or a neighboring landowner whose
premises are adversely affected by the condition of adjoining land,
should not be left without effective relief measures. However, a
fundamental weakness in any approach is the bleak monetary situa-
tion which often prevents such relief. It may well be the comprehen-
sion of such economic realities by future courts that will limit the
influence of Key 48th Street Realty and Puritan Holding Co. on the
law of real property ownership in urban areas.
Eugenia K. Manning
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